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Monnet for Nothing?  









This contribution tries both to assess the impact of the European Union on France and to 
discuss the rich literature on that topic originating both from EU studies, opinion studies, 
public policy analysis and institutional analysis. France’s relationship with the EU appears 
paradoxical given the contrast between the traditional pro-EU involvement of French elites 
and regular expressions of reticence, such as the opposition to the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty by referendum in 2005. This paper offers an account of this paradoxical relationship 
by highlighting the heterogeneity of adaptation to the EU. While public policy and legislation 
are becoming increasingly Europeanised, the EU has a limited impact on political life and the 
domestic institutional system. As a result of this mixed situation, the national narratives for 
supporting French membership to the EU suffer from progressive erosion and 




Cette contribution s’efforce à la fois de saisir l’impact de l’Union européenne en France et de 
discuter la littérature fournie sur le sujet, qu’elle émane des études européennes, des études 
d’opinion, de l’analyse des politiques publiques ou de l’analyse institutionnelle. La relation de 
la France à l’UE est fondamentalement paradoxale comme l’indique le contraste entre 
l’engagement pro-européen de la plupart des élites françaises et l’expression régulière de 
réticences dans la société, à commencer par le rejet du projet de Traité constitutionnel par 
referendum en 2005. Cette contribution s’efforce de questionner ce paradoxe en faisant 
valoir la grande hétérogénéité des modes d’adaptation à l’UE. Alors que les politiques 
publiques et la législation sont de plus en plus européanisées, l’impact de l’Europe sur la vie 
politique et le système institutionnel national reste limité. De cette européanisation 
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This paper presents a critical state of the art regarding France’s Europeanization1. By 
comparing the effect of France’s belonging to the European Union (EU) on French politics, 
institutions and then policies, this note tries to assess whether the EU has really changed 
contemporary France. The title “Monnet for Nothing?” echoes to the fact that, after an initial 
pioneer area, European and political science studies now tend to circumscribe the impact of 
France’s membership. By studying how the party systems, the electoral game, the 
institutional framework and public policies evolve in the EU context, I tend to make the point 
that this current academic trend may have gone too far: even if the main feature of France’s 
Europeanization is to be mixed, the European context do impact greatly on French politics, 
policies and polity. 
 
1. Public opinion and political parties: indifference or not? 
 
 The European issue became controversial in France during the 1990s. Important 
political leaders voiced severe criticisms against Community institutions or, more deeply, 
against the principle of pooling sovereignty. Political parties have been specifically created 
for that purpose. These political endeavours have found popular backing, not only in the EU 
referenda and EU elections, but also in French general elections. This section first presents 
the varieties of the Euroscepticism à la française. It then explains why their effect on French 
politics is limited. The last part nuances this conclusion, by identifying some elements of 
Europeanisation in French public opinion and in French political life. 
 
Four forms of Euroscepticism 
 
Opposition to the European project in France does not start with the Maastricht 
referendum of 1992 (Guieu and Le Dréau 2009). Yet, what is specific to the post-1992 period 
is the parallel development of four distinct organised criticisms to the EU in the French public 
debate (Rozenberg 2007). First, the National Front at the extreme Right recommends the 
withdrawal from the EMU and occasionally from the EU as a whole. Le Pen’s party started to 
reject unambiguously the EU during the 1990s both in order to avoid being surpassed by the 
emerging souverainist movement (see below) and with a view to differentiating itself from 
pro-European Right-wing parties. In this context of party competition, Europe has been all 
the more important for the National Front since European elections are the only possibility to 
                                                 
1
 A revised version of this working paper will be published soon in: Olivier Rozenberg, “France: Genuine 
Europeanisation or Monnet for Nothing?”, in Simon Bulmer & Christian Lequesne, The Member States of the 
European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 edition. 
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access parliamentary representation, as national legislative elections are organized through 
a plurality system. 
Second, the defence of national sovereignty was expressed through the emergence 
of a souverainist movement. The souverainisme (a term borrowed from Quebec’s 
emancipation movement against Canadian tutelage) emerged during the 1992 referendum 
campaign and was active for about one decade. Ideologically, the souverainisme was close 
to other movements in Europe willing to fight for restoring national independence – the nation 
being viewed as the only possible locus for democracy. What was specific to France was, 
first, the ideological foundation of this kind of Euroscepticism. French souveranisme was 
rooted in French history, claiming the legacy of republicanism and/or Gaullism (Hainsworth et 
al. 2004). Second, the souverainisme found support not only at the extreme of the political 
spectrum but within each political family as well, including the Left – even if the movement 
was more marginal there. Born at the National Assembly in 1992, this kind of criticism to 
Europe played a major role in the disputed campaign for the ratification of the Maastricht 
treaty. Several souverainist leaders created their own political formations, the most durable 
one being the MEP Philippe de Villiers’s movement (the “Movement for France” created in 
1994) and the most significant split concerning the Gaullist family (with the “Rally for France” 
created in 1999). Indeed, Chirac’s choice to support the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and, once 
elected President in 1995, to fulfil the Maastricht criteria for the EMU was actually disputed 
by nearly half of the Gaullist MPs, followed by activists and supporters. The political groups 
which derived from the souverainist scissions enjoyed some electoral success: 13% at the 
European elections (13 MEPs) both in 1994 and 1999 (when the Eurosceptic list finished 
second before the official Gaullist one) and 5% at the first round of the French Presidential 
elections of 1995 and 2002, with different candidates. 
 The third form of mobilised criticism to Europe is the emergence of a movement in 
1989, which praised hunting activities, localism and rural ways of life. This group 
concentrated on the opposition to the European legislation on bird protection. However, it 
aimed more generally at protecting local and rural specificities against Brussels’ interference. 
Despite its relatively narrow focus, illustrated by the name of the party Hunting Fishing 
Nature and Traditions, the movement was relatively successful during European elections (6 
MEPs in 1994) and presidential elections (4% in 2002). 
 Lastly, a final group opposing the EU is associated with the left of the political 
spectrum, and in particular the anti-globalization movements. For ideological but also 
geopolitical reasons, the Communists and the extreme Left have for long opposed to the 
European treaties. In 2004/05, those criticisms acquired larger proportions during the 
referendum campaign on the draft Constitutional Treaty, when some Socialist leaders, as 
well as significant portions of socialist activists and supporters, positioned themselves 
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against the Constitution. The denunciation of the pro laissez-faire features of European 
policies and the regret of the lack of Europe sociale are central to the discourse of these 
leftist movements, which remain, in other respects, highly divided internally. 
 The four identified forms of opposition to the EU do not constitute a unified front. 
Instead, they are characterised by different ideological and partisan backgrounds. Yet, the 
addition of their influence has significant consequences. Thus, all together, they contributed 
to the unexpected difficult ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 (12.6 millions “no”, 
48.96 % of the votes), to the unexpected refusal of the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2005 
(15.4 millions “no”, 54.67%) and to the high share of Eurosceptic MEPs represented in 
Strasbourg – up to 40%, as indicated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Votes and seats obtained by the lists to EU elections according to their support for EU treaties 
 
 
Source: Interior Minister. 
 
The endurance of the permissive consensus 
 
 The development and weight of anti-EU movements in France may indicate that 
“Europe” has become a salient issue within French public opinion (Cautrès and Dennis 
2000). Moreover, these developments also highlight a greater impact of the EU on the 
French party system than in other countries (Mair 2000). In this sense, there are signs that 
we may be seeing the end of the prevalent “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970) – a thesis stating that an indifferent public opinion would leave the 
construction of the integration project to national elites. Yet, converging works on the party 
system (Sauger 2005), as well as on public opinion (Evans 2007; Sauger 2008; Duchesne et 
al. 2010; Van Ingelgom 2010) point to a different conclusion: despite the “no” vote on the 
European Constitution in 2005, Europe has not become a source of realignment of the 
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French electorate, nor has the European issue had the effect of de-freezing the party system. 
Three points related to history, public opinion and parties help to understand why the 
permissive consensus continues to endure. 
 First, the idea of a breakdown – even progressive – of the permissive consensus 
does not take into account the specific legacy of French’s relations with the EU (for a detailed 
account, see: Guyomarch et al. 1998; Parsons 2003; Balme and Woll 2005a). In the 
beginning, the European project faced strong opposition both from the Gaullists and the 
Communists, as illustrated by the mobilization against the European Defence Community in 
1954. Even if the Gaullists views evolved when they acceded to power after 1958, and even 
if the Communists started to decline in the late seventies, the European project remained 
questioned in French public debate throughout the Vth Republic. A longitudinal analysis of the 
parties’ manifestos (Sauger 2005) indicates that positive or negative views about Europe 
were present in the manifestos since 1958 and had the most structuring effects from 1978 to 
1986. In addition, the specific French political evolution during the 1980s has contributed to 
forge a pro-European consensus among governing parties, at least for a short period. 
Indeed, the alternation of power between parties in 1981 (when the socialists came to power 
after more than two decades of opposition), the realist shift of the Left in 1983 (when 
Mitterrand decided to stay within the European Monetary System) and the unprecedented 
experience of divided executive in 1986 (repeated in 1993 and 1997) can all be seen as 
factors that imposed to political parties the expediency to avoid confrontation with each other 
on EU issues. From the Single Act in 1986 to the Convention on the Future of Europe in 
2002, all treaty amendments have been negotiated, ratified or implemented either by a 
divided executive or during alternation periods. In contrast with the British case, for instance, 
the responsibility for designing the major orientations of the EU is shared between the Left 
and the Right in France. 
 Second, data on the public perception of the EU indicates both that pro-EU feelings 
still dominate despite a long-term erosion. Since its creation, the Eurobarometer survey has 
asked French citizens if France’s membership to the EU is a good thing, a bad thing or 
neither good nor bad. Figure 2 summarises the results of this survey, presenting a trend 
measure of support to the EU, derived from data collected twice a year during nearly forty 
years.  
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Figure 2. Public support for France’s membership to the EU (1973-2010) 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer data. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm 
 
The figure makes it clear that the support for France’s membership dominates, even after the 
referenda of 1992 and 2005. It is true that the number of French judging that France’s 
membership is “a good thing” reached its peak in the 1980s, and declined after the 
Maastricht treaty. In fact, studies indicate that it was in France and in West Germany that the 
Maastricht effect was most visible in terms of a drop of support and of a dispersion of 
attitudes (Down and Wilson 2008). However, this trend should not be understood as a raise 
of popular dissent, since in this same period the number of respondents judging that the 
membership was “a bad thing” remained low. The negative perception of Europe increased 
indeed very gradually from 5% to 24%. Finally, if we look at the number of answers of 
“neither good nor bad” and “I don’t know”, we can see that between one and two French 
citizens out of five do not have a definite opinion towards the EU. This group of respondents, 
the “Euroindifferent” and the “Euroindecisive”, is in fact bigger than the Eurosceptics. Its 
continuous increase from 1991 to 2005 indicates that the EU has not become a new issue of 
contestation within French public opinion. 
The lack of salience of the EU has also been recently confirmed by a series of 
qualitative studies. Sophie Duchesne et al. (2010) organised several focus groups on the 
European issue and observed that, only six months after the 2005 referendum, no participant 
group mentioned the victory of the “no”, with the exception of political activists. In contrast to 
collective discussions in the United Kingdom, “the discourse of defence of identity and 
sovereignty remain[ed] very marginal” (ibid: 91). Indifference, resignation and boringness 
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sum up French ordinary citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. Eventually, the perception of the 
EU as an autonomous political entity is absorbed both by national post-colonial frames and 
by the emphasis put on globalization, very negatively in the case of France. To some extent, 
these results can be explained by the lack of actual visibility of Europe in ordinary life. In the 
schools, the EU is presented as a collection of Member States (Bozec 2010). News involving 
Brussels are quickly and poorly treated by the French media (Baisnée and Frinault 2008). 
Continental football competitions appear to constitute one of the few layman perceptions 
associated with Europe (Weill 2010). More deeply, the lack of salience of the European issue 
could indicate that the empowerment of the supranational community to the detriment of the 
nation-state is not a matter of concern among ordinary people. Quantitative studies have 
shown for long that there is not necessarily a tension between national and European 
identities (Duchesne and Frognier 2002) – a result that has recently been confirmed with 
reference to French children’s “European identity” (Throssell 2010). 
 Third, the evolution of the French political life since 1992 also leads to minimize the 
impact of the European issue in the domestic context. The comparison established in table 1 
between voters’ attitudes during the two last referenda makes it clear that Right-wing 
supporters were more opposed to and more internally divided about the EU in 1992. In 2005, 
the Left showed more opposition and internal split than the Right. 
 
Table 1. Voters’ decision for the 1992 and 2005 referenda according to party identification 










1992  yes 63 78 49 41 8 
 no 37 22 51 59 92 
2005  yes 37 44 73 80 7 
  no 63 56 27 20 93 
Note: Left-wing voters = Communist, Socialist and Green; Right-wing voters = Gaullist, centre Right and 
nationalist Right, (neo)Gaullist = RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) supporters in 1992 and UMP (Union 
pour un mouvement populaire) in 2005. 
Source: exit poll realised by BVA 20 September 1992; exit poll realised by IPSOS 29 May 2005. 
http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/8074.asp 
 
While both Right-wing and then Left-wing voters (but also activists and leaders) have been 
divided on Europe, both camps have eventually been able to successfully overcome their 
respective divisions. 
 Regarding Right-wing divisions first, the evolution of voters’ attitudes is confirmed by 
other works, as the scale of Euroscepticism developed by Nicolas Sauger et al. (2007: 98s). 
The reasons explaining this minimisation of Euroscepticism for the Right from Maastricht to 
the European Constitution referendum are partially related to the political offer of Right-wing 
parties. Despite some ephemeral successes, the souverainist leaders and MPs became 
marginalized due to the choice of hazardous strategies and/or the radicalisation of their 
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discourse. By contrast, during both Chirac’s presidency (1995-2007) and Sarkozy’s (since 
2007), the main leaders of the Right stood by a pro-EU commitment. This consistency of 
commitment was also facilitated by the length of the political dominance of the Right (from 
1993 to 2012, the Right will have led for 14 years). Yet, empirical analyses are missing for 
fully explaining such a shift at the level of the voter. It can be hypothesised that Right-wing 
supporters may regard the EU as a way of modernizing France’s economy by going beyond 
domestics political and social constrictions.  
 Regarding the Left, the division of the Socialists in 2005 evoked the division of the 
Gaullist in 1992. The leftist split definitively rebuffed the expectations that the socialist 
experience of the power from 1997 to 2002 with Prime Minister Jospin would “[bring] French 
social democracy closer to a median European model” (Ladrech 2001: 37). Clearly, French 
Socialists did not become more reformists as a result of the EU. However, the destabilisation 
of the Left following the 2005 referendum was less severe than the destabilisation of the 
Right after 1992. The explanation for the limited extent of the disturbing effect of the 
European issue rests, again, on the political offer. The leaders of the “no” were particularly 
divided, in organisational but also ideological terms (Crespy 2008; Wagner 2008; Heine 
2009). Thus, they comprised some Socialists, Communists, conflicting Trotskyites and so-
called civil society representatives. In addition, the traditional logic of the Left-Right divide 
became decisive during 2007 Presidential election campaign, given Sarkozy’s radicalisation 
and the enduring trauma for Left-wing supporters caused by the previous Presidential 
election, when the division of the Left prevented Jospin from being selected for the second 
term. 
 The successive evolution of the Right after Maastricht and of the Left after the 
European Constitution shows how resilient the French political system is. The limited 
Europeanisation can be explained by reasons specific to each political family but also by the 
structural tendency of governing parties to circumscribe an issue that divided them internally. 
The avoidance or “muffling” (Parsons 2007) strategy of the main parties can be observed 
through the limited space devoted to Europe in the platforms and speeches2, but also 
through the modification of the institutional rules. Indeed, the regionalisation of the European 
elections in 2004 enabled governing parties to limit the most disturbing effects of these 
elections. Regionalisation has permitted to reduce the seats obtained by EU treaty 
opponents (as indicated in figure 1) and to limit the political significance of the campaign and 
of the results (Costa et al. 2007). 
 
                                                 
2
 Hans-Peter Kriesi (2007) notes that the frequency with which party positions on Europe are mentioned on the 
press during the elections campaign was multiplied by two from the 70s to the 90s but remained twice bellow the 
UK or Switzerland. 
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The silent Europeanisation of French politics 
 
 This analysis of the historical path, public opinion and party system enables us to 
conclude that the EU did not change the way of doing politics in France dramatically. Yet, 
French voters and political leaders are not totally unresponsive to the building of Europe. 
With respect to public opinion, beyond the aforementioned lack of interest for the EU of 
French ordinary citizens, an important number of studies point out that citizens’ opinions 
towards Europe are associated with two broader systems of attitudes in a rather coherent 
way. First, European opinions are correlated to citizens’ relationship to authority and cultural 
liberalism. Opinions can indeed be analysed as the expression of universalistic or anti-
universalistic attitudes, independently of the Left-Right divide (Grunberg and Schweisguth 
1997 and 2003). Thus, the analysis of the 2008 wave from the Value Survey states an 
existing negative correlation between the support to the EU and attitudes related to 
xenophobia, death penalty and authoritarianism, as well as a positive one between support 
and tolerance towards homosexuality and soft-drugs consumption (Belot 2009). Second, 
opinions on Europe also express citizens’ attitudes towards globalisation and market 
economy. Independently from the evaluation of Europe in terms of (loss) of sovereignty and 
national independence, several studies indicate that voters’ views about the EU are also 
organised by the fears regarding the social consequences of the European policies and 
norms (Belot and Cautrès 2004; Brouard and Tiberj 2006; Sauger et al. 2007). During the 
2005 referendum, those social worries were so significant that they dictated a “no” vote to 
some Left-wing supporters who were otherwise keen on sharing sovereignty: one fifth of the 
opponents to the European Draft Constitution were among the more pro-European citizens 
(Sauger et al. 2007: 99). The salience of the social question and the distrust towards 
economic liberalism are not specific to French citizens. They are also important issues of 
concern for their political elites. It is not only that « few politicians of the political mainstream 
openly advocated the benefits of the market as pro-European argument » as Hussein 
Kassim puts it (2008: 266), but also that a part of them seems to doubt the economic 
advantages of the Single Market and the EMU. For instance, the political elites’ reluctance 
towards the 2004 and 2007 enlargements was expressed it terms of the assimilation of 
eastern European countries to economic liberalism. An EU of 27 members was criticized by 
French politicians for being a “laissez-faire Europe” which gives an idea of their lack of trust 
towards the free-market economy (Lequesne 2008; Bickerton 2009).  
 Opinions about Europe hence send us back to two structured systems of attitudes 
based on cultural and economic (anti)liberalism. Most of the time, these attitudes are not 
activated by the governing political parties. Yet, they do matter on some occasions such as 
an EU referendum or during local conflicts when European issues and norms are at stake. 
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These conflicts are well exemplified in the case of the difficult implementation of European 
norms on hunting activities. In such occasion, the resistance to the EU brought back to 
politics alienated social groups which were normally inactive (Mischi 2007). The correlation 
between opinions towards the EU and anti-liberalism also points to the recent trend of the 
Eurobarometer that can be observed in figure 2: since Sarkozy’s election in 2007, the 
rejection of France’s membership has increased to twelve percents, against the five points 
representing the EU mean. This suggests that the enduring permissive consensus may be 
substituted by a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2005) in the future. 
 In the same manner that opinions towards Europe cannot be completely subsumed to 
indifference, the domestic political life has not remained unchanged, even if a new clearcut 
European cleavage has not emerged. Three process of Europeanisation are particularly 
noticeable. First, governing parties can justify painful and unpopular decisions by arguing 
that they are imposed by Brussels. This famous case of blame avoidance has been largely 
used by successive Left-wing and Right-wing majorities, one recent example being, in 2009, 
the justification of the domestic decision to open the capital of La Poste in the name of the 
EU directive of liberalisation of the mail market. Yet with the greater number of domestic, 
political or private actors monitoring EU affairs, the use of Europe as a scapegoat tend to be 
less efficient (Grossman 2007). Second, the EU card has come to constitute a strategic 
resource insofar as it can be played by a political opponent in order to challenge the 
leadership of his/her party or coalition. The strategy of the challenger will thus consist of 
voicing criticisms against the European position of the incumbent party leader. In some 
circumstances, this may lead to the creation of a new party. Most of the time, pro-EU views 
are criticised in the name of ideological purity and of the resolute opposition to the other side 
of the political spectrum. For the Right, this was the case of Chirac against President Giscard 
in 1979, of the souverainistes against Chirac’s pro-Maastricht position in the 90s, and of 
Sarkozy against Chirac’s pro-Turkish policy in the mid-2000s. For the Left, former Prime 
Minister Fabius’s opposition to the European Constitution in 2004 has also been understood 
in terms of a strategic anticipation to the 2007 Presidential election, in a period where the 
leadership of the Left was still uncertain3. More rarely, the challenger can claim a more pro-
EU orientation, as it has been the case since 2002 of the refusal of the centre-right leader, 
François Bayrou, to join Chirac’s party, the UMP. Among other justifications, Bayrou refused 
to join the UMP by stressing the pro-EU commitment of the Christian-democrat family. Yet, 
the lack of emphasis put on EU issues by Bayrou during the 2009 European elections 
supports the idea of a strategic use of the EU card (Rozenberg 2011). Third, an unexpected 
and indirect effect of the European question could be the stronger opposition between pro-
                                                 
3
 The fact that criticizing EU Treaties can be damaging for the statesperson image of a political leader suggests 
that challengers face a trade-off when locating themselves on EU issues. 
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EU parties regarding non-EU issues (Parsons 2007). It can indeed be hypothesized that the 
difficulty of the Socialists and the UMP to oppose the EMU or the end of public monopoly, for 
instance, has resulted in their stronger opposition regarding domestic cultural and societal 
issues. The hypothesis would shed light both on the phenomenon of radicalisation of the 
French Right with Sarkozy (Tiberj 2007) and on the Socialist resistance to the reformist 
social-democrat paradigm (Grunberg and Laïdi 2007). Yet, Brussels severe criticisms to 
Sarkozy’s Rom policy in September 2010 show that no policy field can be now totally alien to 
the EU sphere. Ironically, the radicalisation regarding non-EU issues could feed 
Euroscepticism in the future. 
 
2. The impact of EU membership on French institutions: Europeanisation equals 
hyper-presidentialisation 
 
 In contrast with the complexity we found regarding French public opinion and party 
system, the assessment of the impact of the EU on political institutions is clearer: so far, the 
participation to EU affairs has strengthened the original institutional features of the French 
political system. If the picture is clearer, the paradox here is striking. The EU consensual, 
horizontal and painstaking institutional style is utterly opposed to the majoritarian and 
presidential features of the Vth Republic (Lijphart 1999). In principle, we would expect that the 
influence of EU would result in the softening of these features. On the contrary, France’s 
participation to EU affairs constitutes a remarkable illustration of how the institutional model 
of the Vth Republic operates (Rozenberg 2006). We will see, however, that this adaptive 
capacity does not necessarily translate into healthiness of the institutional system. To a large 
extent, this system is increasingly deadlocked. 
 
The primacy of the President and the centrality of the Prime minister 
 
The President of the Republic is in charge of defining the main objectives of the 
French European policy and of taking ultimate decision in case of governmental conflict 
(Guyomarch 2001; Menon 2001). EU issues thus occupy a significant part of the priorities, 
the exercise and the evaluation of each presidency. European issues were particularly 
central on the agendas of the President Giscard (1974-1981), and of President Mitterrand 
during his second term (1988-1995). Both Presidents indeed acted as if they considered their 
commitment towards the building of a single currency essential to their personal historical 
legacy. This interest in European issues is indicative of the significance of diplomatic and 
symbolic functions of the institution. With his Cyprus counterpart, the French President is the 
only European Head of State that leads a national delegation during European Councils. EU 
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Councils and, more generally, European summits constitute one of the few occasions in 
which the French President can physically incarnate the whole country (Foret 2008). Since 
de Gaulle, the personal involvement of the President has been particularly central in the 
stage setting of the Franco-German relationship (Nourry 2005). More recently, we have 
witnessed how Sarkozy has strengthened the primacy of the institution of the President in EU 
affairs. In July 2007, he went in person to the Eurogroup meeting in order to justify France’s 
economic policy rather than sending his minister for the economy. During the French 
Presidency of the European Council of the second semester of 2008, the priorities of the 
agenda and the official communications were also focused on him, as illustrated by his 
express trip to Moscow during the Ukrainian crisis. The implicit message of this behaviour 
was to oppose the personal energy, voluntarism and commitment of a political leader to the 
alleged lack of dynamism of EU procedures and institutions (Lequesne and Rozenberg 
2008). The only aspect in which Sarkozy, as Chirac before him, has proved to be less at 
ease in EU summits is the obligation to deliver in press conferences, a democratic exercise 
that is usually avoided in France. 
 The primacy of the President regarding major priorities should not lead to neglect the 
central role played by the Prime Minister in the management of the day-to-day Community 
business. The actual execution of the President’s decisions, the preparation of the French 
position regarding EU draft legislation and the transposition of EU norms into domestic 
legislation are realised under the authority of the Prime Minister. This is illustrated by his 
direct responsibility over the SGAE (General Secretary for European Affairs). This 
bureaucratic body in charge of conducting intergovernmental negotiations on EU issues is 
led by the Prime Minister adviser for EU affairs. Contrary to theses prospecting important 
institutional changes in France (Kassim 2008), the domestic management of EU affairs is 
characterised by a significant continuity through time. In this sense, the transformation in 
2005 of the SGCE into the SGAE was just nominal and this institution is still characterised by 
a remarkable administrative centralisation to the detriment of the French Permanent 
representation in Brussels (Lanceron 2007, Lequesne 2010). The density of the 
administrative networks managed by the SGAE, as well as the generalist (rather than expert) 
profile of high civil servants have contributed to limit the participation of ministers and 
politicians in EU affairs (Eymeri 2002). Attempts to get ministers involved more personally in 
EU affairs turned out to be rather unsuccessful. Thus, after the “no” to the European 
Constitution in 2005, an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Europe was created. This committee 
is to hold specific ministerial meetings dedicated to EU issues, under the authority of the 
Prime minister. At the beginning the committee met monthly and, during the 2008 presidency 
weekly. However, since then, these meetings have been far more irregular. 
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The French Parliament: still lazy after all this years? 
 
The French Parliament has obtained important formal prerogatives in the last 
decades, such as the right to be informed of EU documents in 1990, the right for each 
assembly to submit non-binding opinions (called resolutions) on EU draft legislation in 1992, 
and the introduction of the obligation of ministers not to give their official position in the 
Council as far as the parliamentary scrutiny is not completed, in 1994 (Sprungk 2007). The 
constitutional right to adopt resolutions on EU documents was originally limited, given the 
material division between statute law and regulation specified in the French Constitution. 
However, such initial restraint was progressively abandoned, in 1999, 2005 and 2008. In fact, 
the new version of the Article 88-4 of the Constitution allows the National Assembly and the 
Senate to adopt EU resolutions on any Community draft legislation or even on “any 
document issuing from a European Union Institution”4. As a result of the application of this 
article, the number of EU documents sent to both assemblies for which resolutions can be 
made has doubled from 2007 to 2009, as indicated by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. The parliamentary EU resolutions in France (1993-2010) 
 
Sources: Nuttens and Sicard 2000; http://www.senat.fr/europe/dpue-bilan.html; http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/europe/resolutions.asp 
 
                                                 
4
 The article 88-4 says: “The government shall lay before the National Assembly and the Senate drafts of 
European legislative acts as well as other drafts of or proposals for acts of the European Union as soon as they 
have been transmitted to the Council of the European Union. / In the manner laid down by the Rules of Procedure 
of each House, European resolutions may be passed, even if Parliament is not in session, on the drafts or 
proposals referred to in the preceding paragraph, as well as on any document issuing from a European Union 
Institution. / A committee in charge of European affairs shall be set up in each of the Houses of Parliament”. 
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Organisationally, both assemblies have also adapted themselves to the EU by developing 
specific bodies devoted to scrutinizing EU draft legislation and organizing hearings. The 
French delegations to the EU created in 1979 were considerably empowered during the 
1990s in terms of prerogative and human resources5. Called “committees” since 2008, they 
also have more autonomy for adopting resolutions, without having to consult with other 
exclusive parliamentary committees6. In addition, other constitutional amendments adopted 
in 2008 have transposed the prerogatives given to national parliaments by the Lisbon treaty: 
the right to send reasoned opinions as to the conformity of a proposal with the principle of 
subsidiarity (Article 88-6 of the French Constitution), the right to institute proceedings before 
the ECJ for the same matter7 (Article 88-6), and the right to oppose to the Simplified Revision 
Procedure for treaty amendment (Article 88-7). 
 All those elements are certainly not negligible. As a mean, the National Assembly 
enacts eleven EU resolutions a year, and the Senate nine. In 2009, the Senate EU 
Committee organised 52 meetings and published 15 reports. However, the level of 
Europeanisation of the French Parliament still appears to be modest both in comparative and 
concrete terms. Indeed, the amount of legal prerogatives given to the assemblies stands in 
considerable contrast with the modest involvement of the MPs. Outside of the small club of 
EU Committee members, French MPs do not seem to really care about the EU and hardly 
ever deal with Community matters. The enactment of EU resolutions is irregular. Committee 
hearings are poorly attended. Floor debates are scarce. Examples of parliamentary influence 
in the European field are hard to find. To a certain extent, the reasons for this lack of 
involvement are Constitutional and institutional. Major orientations of the European policy are 
difficult to control, given the central role played by the President and its lack of parliamentary 
accountability (Grossman and Sauger 2007). Non-binding opinions can be easily ignored. 
The ex-ante involvement in EU committees is disconnected both to floor debates (Auel 2007) 
and to the transposition phase of the legislative process (Sprungk 2011). But the main 
reason for the modest involvement of the Parliament is to be found in the lack of personal 
incentives given to MPs for dedicating time and energy to EU business – irrespective of 
whether they are vote, policy or office seekers (Rozenberg 2009). 
Beyond the involvement of the French Parliament in the EU legislative process, we 
can identify some other elements of Europeanisation of the legislative branch of the French 
political system. Since 1992, the formal empowerment of the Parliament regarding the EU 
                                                 
5
 Contrary to Grossman’s analysis (2008), it does not seem that the lack of resources of the EU Delegations 
explain the modest involvement of the French Parliament in EU affairs. Rather, the high number of clerks has 
enabled the Delegations to camouflage the lack of personal involvement of the MPs. 
6
 EU committees are actually the only committees specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Yet, there are not 
similar to the eight select committees since mutual belonging is possible, and even compulsory, for EU 
committees. 
7
 This right is open to the political opposition since sixty MPs can activate the procedure. 
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has paved the way for the attributions of new prerogatives in the domestic arena. Thus, 
delegations have been created after the model of the EU ones, to deal with issues such as 
women rights. The idea that the Parliament should give his say in policy-fields directly 
controlled by the President, such as defence policy, is more legitimate than before within the 
political elite. Since 2008, each house of the Parliament has been allowed to pass 
resolutions on any topic (and not only on EU matters), whereas resolutions had been 
expressly forbidden in 1958. Yet again, these forms of Europeanisation should not be 
overstated. The EU is not the only factor accounting for these parliamentary developments. 
In addition, these elements of Europeanisation did not dramatically change the existing 
balance of power of the French political system. The French Parliament is still weak, in EU 
business as elsewhere. 
 
The EU and the progressive empowerment of sub-national authorities 
 
 In contrast to its strong centralist legacy, France has experienced a process of 
devolution. The décentralisation started in 1982 with the Left and was pushed further in 2003 
with the Right. Even if references to European norms and practices have been made 
recurrently in order to call for more devolution (Ladrech 1994), the process was first and 
foremost driven by domestic policy inputs, constraints and considerations. Yet, the discursive 
reference to Europe was occasionally successful. For instance, regional leaders have 
claimed for long that French regions were too small by comparison with their European 
homologues. In 2010, a bill re-organizing significantly local and regional governments 
eventually allowed regional and départemental merging, a choice that could be made in 
Normandy and Alsace in the short future. More generally, the participation of sub-national 
authorities in EU affairs appears as particularly illustrative of their current place within the 
French political system. In EU matters as in other ones, local authorities’ power remains 
limited because of the sustained mediation by the central state. This does not mean that 
there has not been any empowerment in EU affairs. In fact, French metropolitan majors 
frequently lobby Brussels authorities (Le Galès 2002) and French regions are involved in 
“new networks of regional paradiplomacy” (Pasquier 2009). However, local and regional 
governments are still closely under central control, as indicated by the management of the 
structural funds by regional prefects rather than by elected regional councillors (Cole 2008: 
91).  
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A deadlocked institutional model 
 
 The institutions of the Vth Republic have adapted to the EU by perpetuating and often 
strengthening their defining domestic traits. Such a remarkable coherence can be explained 
both by the resilient nature of the domestic institutional setting and by the good fit between 
the diplomatic feature of the EU and the ascendancy of the French President. Yet, several 
elements indicate that the domestic institutional setting is increasingly deadlocked. First, the 
occasional periods of divided governments (cohabitation) appear to be upsetting both 
regarding the European policy of France and the electoral arena. The Constitutional 
ambiguity about who – the President or the Prime Minister – should have the last word 
concerning EU major bargains favours the status quo (Leuffen 2009). Moreover, the relative 
share of responsibility between the two political opponents shadows the democratic game. 
Situations of divided government, however, are less likely since the limitation of the 
Presidential term to five years in 2000, even if they are still possible. 
 Second, the Presidential and majoritarian institutional culture of the Vth Republic 
makes it difficult for French citizens and elite to fully understand the Community method of 
decision-making and the patient quest of the EU decisional system for large consensus. 
French ordinary citizens tend to perceive the EU through the filter of the French presidential 
setting. In the aforementioned focus groups organised in 2005, many French members 
wondered who the President of the EU was, whereas Britons had a parliamentary reading of 
the EU and Belgian citizens were more at ease with a multi-level setting (Haegel et al. 2008). 
Obviously, ordinary citizens are not the only victims of the presidential cognitive filter. 
Political leaders do also have difficulty in understanding the institutional philosophy of the 
EU, as indicated, among others examples, by their long disdain towards the European 
Parliament and by the emphasis put on the European Council (a French initiative) to the 
detriment the Council of Ministers of the EU. In the 2000s, the diffuse diagnosis among 
politicians and high civil servants that the EU was first and foremost suffering from a lack of 
leadership, and therefore needed a permanent President, was also rooted in the 
presidentialism à la française. Likewise, the French EU Presidency of 2008, regarded in 
France as a success, was rather severely judged outside of the Hexagon, and mostly seen 
as a product of Sarkozy’s unilateral and personal style (Dimitrakopoulos et al. 2009). 
 Third, there are some cases where the primacy of the President regarding EU affairs 
does not promote national interests. In comparison with the British Prime Minister, who 
needs to secure a majority at the Commons, or to the German Chancellor, who needs the 
support both from within her coalition and from the Landers, the French President is often 
free from any domestic veto player. Paradoxically, such strength may occasionally weaken 
France’s negotiation position. For instance, Chirac’s shift towards compromise on 
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institutional questions from Nice in 2000 to the European Convention in 2003 has been 
interpreted as a consequence of the lack of domestic constraints that would have weighted 
on the President’ shoulders (Jabko 2004). When the President has a clear agenda with firm 
priorities, the lack of domestic red lines can be an asset. This had been the case for some 
Presidents, who defined their European policy with major domestic problems in mind. Thus, 
De Gaulle’s grandeur international agenda allowed him to go beyond the profound internal 
political divisions of post-war France. Mitterrand’s European vision hid elegantly his 
renouncement to a neo-Marxist agenda. However, in the current period, the European policy 
does not seem to be for the President such a useful mechanism of solving domestic issues. 
As a result, French Presidents cannot assert their priorities so firmly at the EU level. Beyond 
the research of short-term success in the French press like during French 2008 Presidency, 
the internal strength of the President makes him weak in Brussels. 
 Last, the decision-making process that defines the French European position 
obviously suffers from a lack of accountability. The influence of the President on EU 
decision-making contributes to present EU affairs as foreign policy issues, rather than 
domestic issues (Drake and Milner 1999). Many European issues do not find an institutional 
venue where they can be justified, discussed and criticized. The deficit in adequate 
institutional channels results in latent Euroscepticism and, in some cases, in irruptive 
mobilisations against EU norms (Balme 2009: 149). The lack of enthusiasm towards the 
2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement to the EU can be understood under this perspective. 
Political elites failed to build a positive narrative toward the enlargements not only because 
they were nostalgic of the “small Europe” or, as said before, afraid of economic liberalism, 
but also because the issue had remained unquestioned publicly for more than a decade. 
Indeed, the absence of parliamentary debates accompanying the Council meetings during 
the pre-adhesion phase of the enlargement played a fundamental role in the creation of the 
scarecrow of the “Polish plumber” (Grossman and Woll 2011). 
 
3. The impact of EU membership on public policy: somewhere between 20% and 80% 
 
 EU membership has generated in France a change in public policies both in 
substantive and procedural terms. First of all, France is not, or no longer, the “naughty pupil 
of the class” as indicated by French jurisdictions’ decisions or by transposition rate. However, 
several works currently tend to play down the impact of the EU on French policies. In this 
respect, the trend of the literature on public policy is very similar to the works on public 
opinion and parties analysed in the first part: after having acknowledged the growing 
influence of the EU since the 1980s, converging works now tend to minimize it. Yet, this 
recent academic trend can be critically assessed. 
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The progressive acknowledgement of EU law 
 
 The story of the Europeanisation of French public policies is full of clichés: France is 
reluctant to acknowledge the primacy of Community laws, the French State has always been 
late in transposing EU legislation, French citizens only like EU policies when they correspond 
to existing French ones… while these might have been true in the past, several elements 
indicate that this is less and less the case. French judges, politicians and civil servants now 
take EU norms seriously. 
 At first, regarding domestic respect of EU legislation, the decisions of the highest 
French jurisdictions are convergent and increasingly similar to the ECJ doctrine (Masclet et 
al. 2010). France early recognized the immediate applicability of EU laws and their primacy 
on French anterior legislation. That recognition has been favoured by the monist judicial 
order, built on article 55 of the French Constitution that foresees an automatic integration of 
international norms. Tensions between the ECJ and French jurisdictions remained for long 
on two points. On the one hand, they dealt with the direct effect of EU law: it is only in 2009 
(arrêt Perreux) that the Council of State, the highest administrative jurisdiction, recognized 
the invocation by individual citizens of a directive not transposed in due time against an 
individual administrative act (braking with the Cohn-Bendit decision of 1978). On the other 
hand, the divergences regarded the primacy of EU norms on French posterior laws: the two 
highest courts recognized the full primacy of EU norms on French posterior laws in 1975 
(arrêt Jacques Vabre) for the Cour de cassation (the highest court of the French judiciary for 
civil, commercial, social or criminal cases) and in 1989 (arrêt Nicolo) for the Council of State. 
The changes of decisions of the Council of State resulted from the pressure of ECJ decisions 
but can also be understood strategically: the highest administrative court found a role as 
domestic guardian of the EU treaties (Mangenot 2005). In a context of empowerment of the 
Constitutional Council (CC), the opportunity was seized all the more that the CC refused, at 
least up to 2006, to control the respect of EU norms by domestic laws8. A similar strategic 
game was played in 2010 when the Cour de cassation tried, unsuccessfully, to block the 
implementation of the new constitutional right of citizens to initiate proceedings before the 
CC, arguing that it could be damaging to the procedure of requesting preliminary rulings by 
the ECJ.  
The evolution of the CC decisions also strengthened the legal foundation of France’s 
participation in the EU. In 2004, the Council argued that the primacy of EU norms was not 
                                                 
8
 With the Decision IVG of 1975, the CC refused to control the conformity of a national law to EU norms and let 
that task to the other supreme jurisdictions. In 2006 yet, the Council censured a bill on energy for not transposing 
correctly a directive on gas and electricity. That shift is limited since the Council still refuses to control the 
conformity to EU laws of national bills that are not meant to transpose EU legislation. 
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only based on international obligations (art. 55 of the Constitution) but on the article 88-1 that 
stipulates: “The Republic shall participate in the European Union constituted by States which 
have freely chosen to exercise some of their powers in common by virtue of the Treaty on 
European Union […]”. This meant that the Council recognised the EU judicial order as a part 
of the national judicial order and as distinct from the international one. As a result, 
transposing EU norms is regarded as a constitutional obligation and not only as a 
conventional one. A tension still exists between the French courts and the ECJ concerning 
the primacy of EU laws on the French Constitution. In a 2006 decision, the CC indicated that 
it was responsible for monitoring the respect of “France’s constitutional identity” by laws 
transposing EU norms. The notion is vague but recalls that the Council does not consider EU 
treaties and norms as superior to the French Constitution. According to French judges, EU 
norms are supreme only because the French Constitution says so; therefore the French 
Constitution cannot be inferior to those norms. Such a theoretical conflict has been avoided 
so far by amending the Constitution whenever the Council found conflicts between the 
Constitution and EU primary and even secondary legislation9. A new Title was added to the 
Constitution in 1992 and seven of the eighteen Constitutional amendments passed since 
1992 had a European dimension (even if some of them, like parliamentary resolutions, were 
not required by the CC). They are listed in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Constitutional amendments with EU dimension 
 EU norm Fields and contents 
1992 Maastricht City elections for EU citizens, EMU, visa policy, French 









Asylum, migration and borders, parliamentary resolutions 
2003 European arrest 
Warrant 
Justice 
2005 Draft constitutional 
treaty 
Compulsory referendum on EU adhesions, parliamentary 
resolutions (not implemented) 
2008 Lisbon New competencies, parliamentary rights (subsidiarity, 
simplified revision procedure) 
2008 (none) 
 
EU parliamentary committees, parliamentary resolutions, no 
more compulsory referendum on EU adhesions10 
 
                                                 
9
 Regarding the statutory acts resulting from the transposition of EU laws, the requests for preliminary ruling 
asked by the Council of State have also prevented such conflicts. 
10
 The compulsory referendum on EU adhesions was introduced in the Constitution before the 2005 referendum 
in view of disarming the opponents to the Turkish adhesion. Despite his initial objective, Sarkozy did not succeed 
in suppressing totally this clause in 2008. Yet, contrary to what is said in the literature (Lequesne 2008: 65; 
Dimitrakopulos et al. 2009: 462), referendum on adhesion are not compulsory any more since they can be 
avoided by the votes of each assembly, separately and then jointly, at a majority of three fifteenth. 
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The second dimension of the progressive acknowledgement of Community laws rests 
on the improvement of the domestic transposition rate. France was for a long time 
dysfunctional in dealing with EU laws. If the actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its 
obligation are added since the creation of the ECJ (1952-2009), France is the second 
deficient Member state behind Italy with 389 actions vs. 258 for Germany11. The reasons 
were numerous. Ministerial departments occasionally changed the meaning of the directive 
when transposing it. The multiplication of alternating majorities from 1981 to 2002 also gave 
greater priority to the domestic agenda. In a few cases as wild-bird hunting or women’s 
night’s work, the lack of transposition also came from political or social locks. Ultimately, the 
French delay illustrated a more global lack of consideration for the EU both with politicians 
and high civil servants. It should be noted that the French Parliament cannot be made 
responsible for this deficit since the assemblies do not control their agenda and since half of 
the directives adopted by the Council are transposed by statutory means (Bertoncini 2009: 
28)12. The National Assembly has rather put pressure on the government by producing 
annual reports on transposition since 2003. 
To a large extent, France’s transposition deficit is over. The figure 4 presenting data 
for the internal market only brings evidence of a real improvement in the second half of the 
2000s. As a result, France is now close to the EU mean. 
 
Figure 4. France transposition deficit on internal market norms (%) (1997-2010) 
 
                                                 
11
 Source: Annual Report of the Court of Justice, 2009. 
12
 48.5% exactly. Bertoncini established that, on the basis of the 759 directives adopted from 2000 to 2008, 58% 
of the directives adopted by the Council alone had been transposed through laws and 48% of the directives 
adopted through the co-decision procedure. He also reports the synthesis of the analysis realised by the Council 
of State on the legislative or statutory nature of EU acts (according to the French constitutional distinction). On the 
longer period of 1992-2008, the Council of State estimates that 67% of the EU directives had a legislative 
dimension and 68% of the EU regulations. 
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Note: according to the Commission, 1,486 directives and 999 regulations were related to the functioning of the 
Internal Market in 2010, those figures being stable during the whole period. 
Source: European Commission, Internal Market Scoreboard, compilation of the 2
nd
 semester data of the bi-annual 
reports, from n° 1 to n° 19. 
 
Some contextual factors – political stability since 2002, the greater official concern for EU 
issues after the 2005 referendum – may partly explain why France caught up. Yet, the 
awareness came above all from the first financial condemnations by the ECJ in 2005 (about 
fisheries) and in 2006 (about liability for defective products). It should also be noted that 
France’s improvement remains partial: the number of pending infringement cases is 
decreasing quickly but, with 80 cases in late 2010, it is still high compared to other members 
States (the EU average is 46 cases, internal market only)13. During the period 2005-2010, 
France has received as a mean 31 letters a year of formal notice sent for “non-
communication” by the Commission (EU average: 33 letters)14. 
 
The disputed assessment of the impact of the EU on French policies 
 
 Whereas European studies were originally developed in France with the credo that 
EU public policies matter (Hassenteufel and Surel 2008), the assessment of the impact of the 
EU on French policies has been increasingly disputed. After the seminal work on compliance 
with EU norms (Falkner et al. 2005), a series of recent quantitative studies aims at 
challenging Jacques Delors’s false prediction (made in the late 1980s) that in the future 80% 
of the economic legislation will originate from the EU. The ways of assessing quantitatively 
the impact of the EU are numerous and rather complex which explains some significant 
variations exposed in table 3. 
 
Table 3. The quantitative assessment of the EU impact on French legislation 
Source Type of data Period Ratio (n) Ratio (%) 
Bertoncini (2009) Stock of EU acts in comparison 
with the stock of acts in France* 
2008 9,685 / 
26,777 
36% 









Laws transposing EU norms 1986-
2006 
245 /  
1,885 
13% 




163 /  
669 
24% 
 Law & ordinances significantly 
transposing EU norms** 
1999-
2008 
58 /  
669 
9% 
 Articles of laws & ordinances 






Note: International agreements are excluded, except for Brouard and Costa (2009). * Stock of EU acts in 
comparison with the stock of acts in France = ratio between the number of directives and regulations published in 
                                                 
13
 Source: European Commission, Internal Market Scoreboard, n° 19, 2010. 
14
 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/directives/directives_communication_en.htm (10 November 2010). 
O. Rozenberg – Monnet for Nothing? France’s Mixed Europeanisation 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 04/2011 
 
24 
the Official Journal of the EU and the number of laws, ordinances and decrees published in the French Official 
Journal. ** Law & ordinances significantly aiming at transposing EU norms = at least 10% of the articles of the law 
drafted to that end.  
 
The quantitative impact of EU norms on French legislation is therefore estimated between 
7% and one third. In detail, the situation is very different from one policy field to another. If 
the EU legislative agenda is focussed on agriculture and regulatory economic policies 
(Grossman and Brouard 2009), French laws that aimed significantly at transposing EU norms 
have been focussed on economy (16 laws from 1999 to 2008), employment, welfare and 
health (10), justice (9), transport and equipment (8) (Fekl 2010). 
 In addition to the quantitative assessment of the EU impact, several recent case 
studies also tend to minimize the Europeanisation of French public policies. By comparing 
several policy fields across Members States, Mark Thatcher (2007a) concludes that the 
transposition process allows a high degree of autonomy to each government. In some cases, 
French policy-makers have used the alibi of a directive to implement dramatic reforms, far 
beyond the European prescriptions. In others, they have succeeded in adapting the 
European model to domestic constraints. This is particularly the case for the former national 
State-owned monopoles that were granted a large span of time to adapt to liberalisation. 
Regarding environmental issues, Pierre Lascoumes (2008) indicates that the ambiguity and 
the modification of the main objectives of this policy gave to French policy-makers a margin 
of manoeuvre when they translated them to national scale. In the economic field, Ben Clift 
estimates that there is still a “dirigist instinct” (2009: 164) among French elite as illustrated by 
the new credo of “economic patriotism” developed in the mid 2000s. He acknowledges that 
EU policies have challenged the ‘French Developmental State’ but observes that, as a result, 
“[…] French economic interventionism in the 1990s and 2000s has focused more on 
microeconomic, rather than macroeconomic policy” (ibid: 166). For instance, the 
implementation of the take-over 2004 directive paradoxically strengthened the anti-takeover 
opportunities of domestic firms. The merging policy in the field of energy particularly 
illustrates the unforeseen impact of market liberalisation. At a more sociological level, 
continuity in the policy-makers identity can also be observed. The members of the regulatory 
agencies for instance still originate from high civil service, particularly from the State’s grands 
corps (Baudy and Varone 2007; Thatcher 2007b). 
Another point raised in order to minimize the European impact is the congruence 
between EU and French norms (Brouard et al. forthcoming). This fitness would first and 
foremost derive from France’s influence within the EU. Thus, in his analyse of Chirac’s 
presidency (1995-2007), Kassim (2008) challenges the thesis of a French malaise (Keeler 
and Schain 1996; Grossman 2007) and estimates that, especially trough the strategic 
partnership with Germany, France can still minimize the EU constraints. The avoidance of a 
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sanction for excessive deficit in 2003 and even the reform of the stability pact negotiated in 
2010 give credit to this point of view. Since the Greek financial crisis of spring 2010, French 
officials have indeed appeared more concerned by a degradation of France’s financial 
ratings than by EU hypothetical sanctions. In policy fields where it has become more difficult 
for France to get full satisfaction, like the CAP, regional aids and environment, there are 
some indications that a “re-nationalisation” is ongoing (Smith 2008). 
 Finally, it should be said that, as for public opinion and political parties, minimizing the 
EU impact should not be led too far. There are indeed some risks of subsiding the “80%’s 
myth” by a “new 20%’s myth”15 since a large part of the Europeanisation process is 
impossible to assess quantitatively. The references to “Europe” can take indeed a great 
variety of forms from EU legislation, to the praise of national champions (Denmark for 
instance), transnational networks or even geopolitical considerations. Precisely thanks to this 
great heterogeneity Europe can matter, i.e. help or constraint policy-makers. Thus, several 
case studies established that the reference to Europe has been central to some policy 
enterprises in fields where EU competencies were limited or inexistent like the Welfare 
reforms of 1995 (Palier 2002), the professionalization of French army in 1996 (Irondelle 
2003), the parity laws in favour of women representation in 1999 (Bereni 2004) or the 
University curriculum reform since 2002 (Ravinet 2008). As regards more specifically the 
implementation of EU norms, the idea that EU norms are adapted nationally rather than 
merely dictated should not lead to neglect that, at the end of the day, those norms matter and 
they do so especially in a country where the State has historically played a unique role in 
shaping the nation and the economy. To give just but one example, the ECJ definition of the 
civil service narrowly focussed on the exercise of government authority contributes to a full 
redefinition of who civil servants are, and indirectly of what the French state’s missions 
should be (Eymeri 2006). Pierre Muller et al. (1996) seminal intuition that the production of 
constraining legal norms by a non-statist system constitutes a radical innovation is still 





 This general overview of the impact of EU membership on France enables to 
conclude that France has really changed by participating in the EU. Such conclusion stands 
in contrast with a large part of recent studies that tend to minimize the impact of the EU on 
French domestic politics and policies, after an initial period of enthusiasm in the 1980s and 
                                                 
15
 I borrow the expression to Katrin Auel, conference in Sciences Po Paris, 18 January 2010. 
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1990s. For sure, Monnet did not act for nothing. Yet, the chapter has also highlighted how 
mixed the Europeanisation process is. Public policies and policy-making changed 
dramatically even if the domestic legislation is not dictated by the EU institutions. Domestic 
institutions have also evolved but mostly in order to strengthen France’s parochialism. The 
impact of the EU is more limited with regard to public opinion and politics. The EU has 
occasionally destabilised the party system and offered some new tips for political 
entrepreneurs but most of the political leaders have chosen a strategy of avoidance of EU 
issues. Therefore, the inner European cleavages within public opinion are not activated by 
the political offer. They are only expressed on a few occasions as the 2005 referendum. The 
rest of the time, the “threatening indifference” of political elites and citizens feed each other. 
 To a large extent, the uncertainty of France’s commitment towards the EU exposed in 
the introduction can be explained by this mixed aspect of the Europeanisation process. The 
contrast between the impact of the EU over public policies and the relative torpor of the 
public debate on Europe is certainly not specific to France. What is more specific is that 
national institutional system reinforces this contrast: parliamentary debates are rare; the 
President is not held accountable for his EU policy; EU bargains are perceived as diplomatic; 
high civil servants do their best to circumscribe the politicians’ involvement. The institutional 
features of the Vth Republic have been strengthened by France’s EU membership but do not 
contribute to politicise that membership. 
In a sense, the resilience of the French institutional and party system makes France’s 
European policy more regular and constant. The stability of the political system contributed 
for instance to minimize both the external and the internal effects of the 2005 referendum. 
Yet, the mixed nature of the Europeanisation process also leads to the development of two 
other phenomena that could, in the future, impact on France European policy. First, the 
Europeanisation process is increasingly silent. As written by Richard Balme (2009: 142): 
“European integration lost the prominent position it occupied on public policy agendas during 
the 1970s and 1980s”. While Europe was used by governing leaders to camouflage domestic 
renunciations for the best, or as a scapegoat for the worst, the mobilizing potential of the 
European reference is less and less efficient. The narrative of the Europe puissance has 
been eroded. As a result, and this is the second aspect, mainstream political parties and 
leaders tend to develop a catch-all discourse integrating pro and anti EU elements, as the 
last European elections in 2009 made clear (Rozenberg 2011). So far, such a way of playing 
softly with Euroscepticism has remained discursive and has not impacted France EU policy. 
Among other elements, the September 2010 clash between Sarkozy and Barroso over Roma 
migrants indicates that this might no longer be the case in the future16. 
                                                 
16
 I am grateful to Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, and as well to Richard Balme, Yves Doutriaux, Sophie 
Duchesne, Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, Angela Tacea and Cornelia Woll for their help. 
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